كنفرانس بين المللی مهندسی صنايع و سيستم ها

صفحه اصلی / دوازدهمین كنفرانس بين المللی مهندسی صنايع و سيستم ها

Designing Optimal Service Level Agreements for IoT Reliability in Food Supply Chains: A Game-Theoretic Approach

نویسندگان :

Iman Rahmati¹

1- دانشگاه تهران

کلمات کلیدی :

Internet of Things،Supply Chain Resilience،Game Theory،Agency Theory،Digital Paradox،Service Level Agreement،Moral Hazard

چکیده :

The global agri-food supply chain is undergoing a rapid digital transformation to enhance end-to-end traceability; however, this integration introduces severe systemic vulnerabilities regarding network reliability and information asymmetry. Because a significant portion of Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructure is deployed and maintained by third-party technology providers, a state of moral hazard emerges when the costs of high-effort preventive maintenance outweigh immediate contractor benefits. This paper shifts the analytical focus from technical hardware mitigation to strategic contractual governance. Utilizing Agency Theory and game-theoretic mathematical modeling, we systematically evaluate the behavioral and economic dynamics between food manufacturers and external IoT service providers. The primary objective is to formulate an optimal Service Level Agreement (SLA) that enforces incentive compatibility. By mathematically deriving the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) for penalty and bonus structures, this paper provides a robust quantitative framework that mitigates moral hazard and optimizes the continuous operational reliability of IoT ecosystems. Specifically, the model reveals that incentive compatibility is achieved only when the sum of performance bonuses and penalties is at least equal to the risk-adjusted cost of the agent's effort. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analyses further demonstrate how variations in technological efficiency and effort costs dictate the optimal financial boundaries of these contracts.